On State Censorship
Like most, I remain to have certain reservations on unbridled expressions which may be harmful to other people’s rights, else to public order. Nevertheless, it was been a dilemma for me to appreciate censorship as an inherent mechanism in implementing regulation. The reason for this is that I somehow distinguish between acceptable acts where content is an incidental result and acceptable content where act is an incidental cause.
I can be agreeable to the regulation of acts — as what may be acceptable would be ingrained in the laws of the country that enforces them, and the duty of people (whether personally agreeable or not to the scope of such laws) to comply therewith for the simple fact that they are subjects of such country (whatever the nature of the government that is subsisting therein). Conventions and treaties would be instrumental in expanding the scope of the enforcement of such laws, depending upon the adherence of countries to such treaty/convention, else the acceptance of such treaty/convention as customary international law by countries which do not formally adhere to such. I have, thus, no objection in the formulation of the “law of the net” in the determination of common prohibited acts and simplification of court jurisdiction to punish such acts. Corollarily, regulation of acts by private entities (such as determined in the terms and conditions provided by an Internet facility or service provider) does not depart from this premise, inasmuch as agreements are within the purview of the law on contracts. The content of the contract is the law between the parties. In furtherance, therefore, the content resulting from the infringing act would be justifiably removed, not because of censorship but due to the enforcement of law.
I cannot agree, however, with the regulation of content, per se — as what may be acceptable would be subject to the standards of governments, institutions, societies, and individuals; depending upon the relationship of the one advocating it in relation to power of control or formulation of policy; and depending whether the perceived evil sought to be prevented is actual/real or assumed to be real; among others. I am currently unable to find a single and consistent point of reference. The myriad of factors to be considered renders the application of such regulation, especially as to its “acceptable” scope, quite subjective and situational. The points of justification, further, to market its palatability, appear disjointed or alternative, rather than cumulative. I wonder, hence, considering the direction to promote fully the upheld freedom of expression, whether “the utilization of censorship would eventually be contradictory in the end” (similar to instances in the advocacy of democracy or the democratic process, which sometimes undermine the target audience’s right to self-determination in choosing their own preferred system).
Is censorship (at any degree) actually acceptable?
A central issue in my predicament is the proper appreciation of extreme content. Even considering the effect of such literature on real world events, which would provide the justification for their censorship, I still cannot bring myself to accept the prospect of having absolute non-availability of such content. I would not be able to make an informed criticism, else rejection, of such extreme position without resort to its original articulation. Resort to the abridged version of the literature from a “more acceptable” source, albeit secondary, would not suffice for such purpose. A sanitation of resources, depending upon the dominant agenda, could discourage a deeper discourse, and an introspection or reinforcement of certain beliefs or positions within the moderate spectrum. In the end, would the goals be better served by suppression of expression, or by the cultivation of a mature audience that would intelligently appraise expressions?
